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ABSTRACT
Increased interconnectivity of Cyber-Physical Systems, by design
or otherwise, increases the cyber attack surface and attack vectors.
Observing the effects of these attacks is helpful in detecting them.
In this paper, we show that many attacks on such systems result in a
control loop effect we term Process Model Inconsistency (PMI). Our
formal approach elucidates the relationships among incomplete-
ness, incorrectness, safety, and inconsistency of process models.
We show that incomplete process models lead to inconsistency.
Surprisingly, inconsistency may arise even in complete and correct
models. We illustrate our approach through an Automated Teller
Machine (ATM) example, and describe the practical implications of
the theoretical results.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Cyber-Physical Systems can range from industrial control systems
(ICS) to Internet of Things (IoT) systems, and encompass a wide
variety of protocols, buses, and networks. While the definition of
a Cyber-Physical System (CPS) is still evolving, we assume a CPS
consists of interacting networks of physical devices and computa-
tional components that may be remotely controlled [16]. While an
earlier CPS may have been designed as a stand-alone and isolated
system, modern CPS are designed with connectivity assumptions.
For example, the three-tier architecture for modern IoT systems
described in [19] makes connectivity assumptions explicit. Due
to intentional or unintentional network connectivity through the
Internet or other means, no CPS can be assumed to be isolated. The
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consequence of the increased interconnectivity among the systems
is the addition of new cyber attack surfaces, and vulnerabilities
exploitable with new or existing attack vectors.
To detect an attack, or evaluate the effect of an attack on a system,
accurately observing the system state is very useful. A key question
in this context is, "are there limitations on the observability of the
system state that reduce the ability to conclude that an attack is
happening or has happened?" Our main contribution in this paper is
an answer to this question. We define Process Model Inconsistency
(PMI) effect, and establish how PMI can be manifested as a result of
several attacks identified in the literature (Section 3). In Section 4 we
prove the limitations on observability of PMI effects. We illustrate
how PMI effects may be masked with an example in Section 5. In
Section 5.1, we describe practical implications of limitations on
observability, and we conclude in Section 6.
2 RELATEDWORKS
An effect is a consequence of an attack. Distinct attacks may result
in the same effect. This implies there could be physical effects as
a result of cyber attacks, and there could also be cyber effects on
system components as a result of physical attacks. For example, a
tampered tire pressure gauge may show low tire pressure indicator
on the dashboard of a car, while there is perfectly adequate tire
pressure. Cyber effects can manifest in various domains, ranging
from political instability to accidents. Ormrod et al. [23] present a
System of Systems (SoS) cyber effects ontology that attempts to cap-
ture the breadth of cyber effects across physical, virtual, conceptual,
and event domains within the context of a battle. The cyber effects
on human decision making, originating from passive and active
cyber attacks, is studied by Cayirci et al. [6]. Huang et al. have
analytically assessed the physical and economical consequences of
cyber attacks [13].
The physical effects on a CPS vary widely depending on the
system and where the CPS is used, and therefore are difficult to
categorize. In contrast, the cyber effects are relatively easier to
categorize. The following categories of cyber effects are identified
for Army combat training: Denial of Service (DoS), Information
Interception, Information Forgery, and Information Delay [20]. The
cyber effects on the controller of the physical process change the
operations of the process control system and the physical process
in subtle ways. For process control systems, the security and pro-
tection of information is not enough, and it is necessary to see how
the attacks affect estimation and control algorithms of a CPS, thus
directly changing the physical world [4]. Han et al. [11] describe
more obvious effects of cyber attacks such as draining out limited
power of sensors, disrupted or incorrect routing, desynchronization,
and privacy invasion through eavesdropping. Wardell et al. [29] add
ar
X
iv
:1
90
3.
09
48
2v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
2 M
ar 
20
19
HoTSoS ’19, April 2–3, 2019, Nashville, TN, USA S. K. Damodaran and P. D. Rowe
Actuators Sensors
Controlled	Process
Process Input Process Output
Control Input ( set points, commands )
Control Action
FeedbackOperation
Disturbance
Controlled	
Variables
Measured	
VariablesController
Process	Model
Cyber
Physical
Conflicting control actions
Controller 2
Figure 1: CPS Control Loop
changing of set points, sending harmful control signals, changing
operator display to the list of effects. Cardenas et al. [5] describe
physical attacks on sensors, actuators, or on the physical plant,
deception attacks carried through the compromises of sensors and
actuators, and DoS attacks that make signals unavailable to the con-
troller or physical process. The effects of these attacks to the system
could be missing or altered signals. Mitchel and Chen [21] specify
three types of failures in the context of modern power grids: attri-
tion failure when there are insufficient actuators or control nodes
to apply control, pervasion failure when the failed actuators and
control nodes collude, and exfiltration failure when the adversary
obtains the grid data. Some of these cyber effects could also deceive
a human operator who is part of the decision making process of
the controller [29].
Developing a behavior model for a non-trivial CPS is a challeng-
ing problem because of the diversity of the system components, the
phases of operations, and the need to reconcile the control, phys-
ical, software, and hardware models. Rajhans et al. [26] provide
a framework to integrate heterogeneous aspects of a system into
a consistent verifiable behavior model. This problem is worsened
in practice due to the unavailability of any documented specifica-
tions for some system components. Pajic et al. [24] discuss resilient
statistical state estimation techniques while under attack as part
of the DARPA HACMS project. Ability to sufficiently observe the
properties of the CPS in operation is a requirement for accurate
state estimation.
CPS effects have been analyzed by modeling a CPS as a multi-
layered system with physical, sensor/actuator, network, and control
layers [2, 11]. Alternately, CPS effects have been also studied by
modeling it as a control system [5, 10, 22]. The control system based
modeling approach opens up specific ways to identify cyber effects
and link them to attacks, as discussed in the next section.
3 PROCESS MODEL INCONSISTENCY
Clark and Wilson have argued [7] that external consistency, the
correspondence between the data object and the real object it repre-
sents, is an important control to prevent fraud and error. An attack
may cause a change in the system that we term an effect. An effect
may cause other changes in the system that we term derived effects.
In this section, we show why process model inconsistency is an
important derived effect on CPS through a control loop based anal-
ysis of cyber and physical effects. In Section 3.1, we describe the
control loop view of CPS. We map the cyber and physical effects to
derived effects to control loop elements, and show in Section 3.2
that inconsistency of process model is an important category of
effect to a control loop.
3.1 Control Loop View of CPS
A control loop, as shown in Figure 1, is a significant and discernible
feature of any non-trivial CPS. A CPS that is a SoS may contain
multiple such control loops that span multiple subsystems [15].
Figure 1 describes a simplified control loop derived from the de-
scriptions of a control loop used for safety analysis [17] and security
analysis [22].
The controller in Figure 1 can include humans, or can be a fully-
automated system, or it can be a semi-automated system with
humans-in-the-loop. Stated differently, a human can be considered
a part of the controller. Humans may also be participants in the
controlled process, responsible for providing sensory inputs to the
controller. The controller may include estimation algorithms and
controlling algorithms [5]. The controller receives inputs from exter-
nal entities such as set points, or other commands such as resets. All
controllers must maintain a model of the controlled process, called a
process model, within [17]. The dynamic behavioral aspects of the
model are constructed and maintained by the controller by process-
ing themeasured variables provided by the sensors. The sensors may
provide these inputs to the controller directly or indirectly through
stored media such as logs. A controller can represent the dynamic
behavior of the controlled process in a process model. A process model
is a behavioral model of the controller, and one way to represent
it is by using a state diagram. DEVS formalism [31] and hybrid
automata [12] use state diagrams to represent process models.
A state in a state diagram at time t0 is identified by the values
assigned to a set of state variables at t0 by the controller. These
state variables are distinct from the measured variables in that the
measured variables are communicated through the communication
link between the sensors and the controller, while the state variables
are maintained by the controller within the process model. The state
variables have the important property that the values of the state
variables at time t0, combined with the values ofmeasured variables
collected during the time period between t0 and time t > t0 are
sufficient to predict the values of state variables at time t , assuming
the controller processes themeasured variables instantaneously. The
controller provides the controlled variables to the actuators which
apply corresponding operations to the controlled process. The system
could include humans providing inputs to actuators as well. For
example, in an elevator system, the users of the system can be
considered to provide sensory inputs or measured variables to the
controller by pressing buttons.
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We highlight the upper half of Figure 1 as the cyber domain, and
the lower half as the physical domain, to signify the digital process-
ing of information in the upper half. The controller, in this figure, is
a digital information system that receives and produces digital val-
ues, while the controlled process is operated with analog inputs and
processes. In a large system, however, designating a system compo-
nent as either a cyber or physical component requires additional
considerations. For example, it is possible that the controlled process
has some digital components, and the operational input from the
actuators are digital values. In such cases, if the cyber elements
are fully embedded in the physical system and the cyber elements
are not explicitly modeled in the process model, we assume it is a
physical component for the purpose of our analysis.
3.2 Mapping Effects to Control Loop Effects
Leveson [18] describes a number of things that can go wrong in
the control loop from a safety perspective. While the cyber attacks
can cause the same kinds of effects as natural faults occurring with
aging or fatigued components, analyzing cyber attacks can be more
complex due to multiple reasons. Cyber attacks are intentional
activities, as opposed to natural faults. Cyber attacks may cause
multiple effects in different times from the same attack, wheres the
probability of occurrence of multiple natural faults is lower than
the probability of occurrence of a single fault. Often the effects may
be chained together to form a kill-chain. A kill-chain for a CPS
may begin with a reconnaissance phase for collecting information
flowing through the system as preparation for mounting an attack
on the controlled process [10]. The effects caused by cyber attacks
may seem unrelated as well, since the attacker has control over
what effects are applied, and where.
In Table 1, we map the different types of cyber effects [5, 11, 20,
29], and their impacts to control loop components (Figure 1). Cyber
effects in CPS can also be caused by physical attack. For example,
sensors or actuators may be damaged, tampered with, or attacked
with electromagnetic pulse (EMP) [6], resulting in altering the
measured variable values or applying wrong or delayed operations
to the controlled process. Therefore, cyber effects in CPS can result
from cyber, or physical attacks, as shown in Table 2.
One common category of effect to the control loop is the in-
consistent process model, as seen from Table 1. Let us explore this
effect further. Young and Leveson [30] note that many accidents
stem from the inconsistencies between the process model and the
state of the controlled process. Inconsistency of the process model
can represent effects stemming from sensor tampering, or effects
on the measured variables or the feedback to the sensors, as shown
in the cyber effects in Table 2, and the impact of these cyber effects
in Table 1. Changes to the actuators and the controlled variables
can also result in altered controlled process behavior. These effects
may change the process model to be inconsistent as well, since the
operations that were applied to the controlled process could be dif-
ferent from what the commands to actuators suggested. However,
not all effects could be represented by inconsistency of the process
model. In particular, the tampering of process input directly into the
controlled process may not lead to an inconsistent process model if a
sensor is able to pick-up the changes in the controlled process that
result from this input. Leveson [18] points out that a process model
Table 1: Control loop effects from cyber effects
Cyber Effects
Type
Control Loop
Element Control Loop Effects
Information
deception
including forgery,
spoofing, replay
Measured variable
Inaccurate estimated
values and inconsistent
process model, Operator
deception
Controlled variable Altered controlled pro-cess
Control input Altered controlleralgorithm
Information
interception
Measured variable,
Feedback
Inaccurate estimated val-
ues and inconsistent pro-
cess model, Operator de-
ception
Controlled variable,
Operation
Altered operation of the
controlled process
Information
flooding (DoS)
Measured variable,
Feedback
Inaccurate estimated val-
ues and inconsistent pro-
cess model, Operator de-
ception
Controlled variable,
Operation
Altered operation of the
controlled process
Information
timing including
delay,
desynchronization
Measured variable
Inaccurate, delayed esti-
mated values and incon-
sistent process model, Op-
erator deception
Controlled variable,
Operation
Altered operation of the
controlled process
Information
exfiltration
Measured variable,
Feedback, Controlled
variable, Operation
Privacy violation
Process input
tampering Controlled process
Altered controlled pro-
cess
Process output
tampering Controlled process Altered process output
Information
interception Control input
Conflicting control inputs
and incorrect control be-
havior
can be incomplete or incorrect. If the process model is incomplete or
incorrect, it can be also inconsistent with the state of the controlled
process even without cyber effects applied. Even if the process model
is (statically) complete and correct, inconsistencies may arise dy-
namically during its operation. This may be due, for example, to
adversarial modifications of signals causing a controller to have a
false view of the state transition actually taken by the controlled
process, even if the actual transition taken is possible in the process
model. In the next section, we formalize the concept of inconsistent
process model as Process Model Inconsistency (PMI) effect, and
prove its properties.
4 PROCESS MODEL, STATES, AND
PROPERTIES
In the previous section, we identified inconsistent process model
as an important control loop effect caused by other effects. In this
section we define this effect precisely so that the limitations on
the observability of this effect can be studied. As we described in
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Table 2: Control loop effects from physical effects
Physical
Effects Type
Control Loop
Element
Immediate Cyber &
Control Loop Effects
Physical
tampering
Sensor
Information deception,
Information interception,
Information timing
Actuator
Information interception,
Altered operation of the
controlled process, Attrition
failure, Pervasion failure
Drained power
Sensor
Information deception,
Information interception,
Information timing
Actuator
Information interception,
Altered operation of the
controlled process, Attrition
failure, Pervasion failure
Section 3.1, a cyber-physical system has at least one control loop,
with messages or signals transmitted among the components partic-
ipating in the control loop. These components may be distributed
geographically, or logically separated, and hence we need to model
the dynamic aspects of a cyber-physical system as a distributed
system of communicating components, where each such compo-
nent can be a system with its own subcomponents. A process model
describes this dynamic behavior of the system, and a state space
may be used to represent the process model and its properties. A
process model may be used to represent both (a) the controller’s
belief about the state of the controlled process, (Figure 1) and (b) the
actual state of that process. In this section, we formalize process
model inconsistency (PMI) as a discrepancy between these two
models and characterize the ways in which it can arise.
4.1 Process Model and Observability
The term process model is used to describe the dynamic behavior of
an individual component of a system.We use the term global process
model for the synthesized process model of all the components. A
formalism to study such resultant behavior of synthesized process
models in System of Systems (SoS) is the Discrete EVent Simulation
(DEVS) formalism, applicable to digital and analog systems [31].
The DEVS formalism accomplishes SoS modeling by defining
two types of models: atomic and coupled. When a system cannot be
decomposed any further, its behavior is specified through an atomic
DEVS model. A coupled model allows SoS constructs to be built as
a hierarchical structure that comprises atomic and coupled models.
Let us review atomic DEVS and coupled DEVS model definitions
[31] below:
Definition 1. DEVSatomic =< X , S,Y , λ,δint ,δext ,δcon , ta >,
where
• X is the set of inputs described in terms of pairs of port and
value: {p,v},
• Y is the set of outputs, also described in terms of port and value:
{p,v},
• S is the state space that includes the current state of the atomic
model,
• δint : S → S is the internal transition function,
• δext : Q × Xb → S is the external transition function that is
executed when an external event arrives at one of the ports,
changing the current state if needed, Q = {(s, e)|s ∈ S ,0 ≤
e ≤ ta(s)} as the total state set, where e is the time elapsed
since the last external transition, and Xb is the set of bags over
elements in X ;
• δcon : S × Xb → S is the confluent function, subject to
δcon (s,) = δint (s) that is executed if δext and δint end
up in collision; and
• λ : S → Y is the output function that is executed after internal
transition function is completed,
• ta(s) : R+0,∞ is the time advance function.
Definition 2. DEVScoupled =< X ,Y ,D, {Md }, {Id }, {Zi,d } >, for
each component model, d ∈ D, where,
• D is a set of labels assigned uniquely to each component model
• Md is a DEVS model of d
• Id is the influencer set of d : Id ⊆ D∪{DEVScoupled },d < Id ,
and for each i ∈ Id ,
Zi,d is an i-to-d coupling such that
Zi,d : X → Xd is an external input coupling (EIC), if
i = DEVScoupled
Zi,d : Yi → Y is an external output coupling (EOC),
if d = DEVScoupled
Zi,d : Yi → Xd is an internal coupling (IC), if i ,
DEVScoupled and d , DEVScoupled
Hybrid automata theory [12] is another established formalism
used in robotics for behavior modeling. In both formalisms, the
dynamic behavior of the system is defined using states. Therefore,
we use states for representing process models.
In a distributed system, the inputs are delivered to system compo-
nents usingmessages, and output messages are generated by system
components. Therefore, in Definition 1, the inputs and outputs are
messages. We assume that a message contains values assigned to
a set of message variables. The components of a system also have
component variables whose values determine the state of that com-
ponent. The values in message variables are mapped to and from
component variables as the system runs. In CPS, the component
variable values of the controller are either used to store (1) the val-
ues of measured variables encapsulated in messages from sensors,
or (2) the commands or estimations of controlled variables (Figure
1). We discuss the concept of state in more detail below.
In Definition 1, S is the state space of an atomic component of a
cyber-physical system. As a running example, let us consider an
elevator with a simple control loop. The controller must maintain
a process model for the various components it controls. Among
those is the elevator car. We assume this process model encodes
two possible states of the elevator car: RUNNING or STOPPED. Its
internal model of the full system would also contain states for other
components such as the status of the doors on various floors. The
global state would then be an n-tuple of local states Σ = (S1, ..., Sn ),
where Si is the local state of the component i [3, 8]. For simplicity,
we focus only on models for atomic components since PMI can
already arise in this case. We denote the state space of an atomic
model as S .
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Table 3: Elevator Car Controller Multivariable
statusCarDoor motorRunning state
CLOSED * RUNNING
OPEN OFF STOPPED
The controller determines this local state from the values stored
in a sequence of component variables, wherein each constituent
component variable has a set of potential values. A component
variable may be assigned values during the system operation, which
may be normal operation or abnormal operation caused by natural
failures or cyber attacks. These values may be discrete, or analog.
For analog values such as temperature readings, we assume they
are discretized. In our case, we imagine the controller populates
two variables (statusCarDoor, and motorRunning) based on data
from sensors. The cartesian product of all of the possible values
of these component variables for each component defines all the
possible combination of values these variables can assume. We
define a multivariable to capture this concept.
Definition 3. A multivariable, V S = < v1,v2, ...,vm > may be
defined for a state space S , where v j may assume any values from
the set of values in P j . The potential ordered m-tuple values the
multivariable can assume are in the multivariable space P = (P1 ×
P2 × ... × Pm ). Elements p ∈ P are called variable assignments.
In the elevator example, the controller maintains two component
variables to store its state: <statusCarDoor, motorRunning>. The
statusCarDoor variable can assume any value from the set P1 =
{CLOSED, OPEN}, and the motorRunning variable can assume any
value from the set P2 = {ON, OFF} (Table 3). In the table, for brevity,
we use "*" to denote all possible values of that variable.
The mapping of variable assignments to the states of the elevator
car are also shown in Table 3. This mapping is the state model,
defined below. The constituent variables of a multivariable used
in such mapping in the state model are also referred to as state
variables.
Definition 4. A state model is a triple (P , F , S) where F : P → S a
surjective partial observation function. A variable assignment p ∈ P
is observable iff p is in the domain of F .
The use of a partial function F in Definition 4 is important. Vari-
able assignments not in the domain of F typically correspond to
combinations of values assigned to variables that are not thought to
be possible. For example, in themodel of the elevator car maintained
by the car controller, there is no state associated to the variable
assignment (OPEN, ON) because the car motor should never be run-
ning while the door is open. An implementation may have enough
foresight to include an ERROR state in the state space S . This is easy
enough to do with simple models. However, with more complex
models, some variable assignments may not be observable because
the programmers did not think they were possible. Exactly how the
state gets updated (or not) will depend on the details of the imple-
mentation. For the purposes of our formalization, it is sufficient to
allow the observation function to be partial and consider variable
assignments outside the domain of F to be unobservable.
Definition 5. A process model (P , F , S,T ) combines a state model
with a transition relation T ⊆ S × S .
4.2 Incorrectness and Incompleteness
The process model maintained by a controller represents only those
states and transitions the controller knows to expect. We therefore
refer to the process model maintained by a controller as a known
process model (Pk , Fk , Sk ,Tk ). Unfortunately, reality is almost al-
ways richer than this model. For example, the “true state space”
of an elevator car would be more than just the set {RUNNING,
STOPPED}. It would capture whether the car was moving UP or
DOWN, what floor it is at, if it is between floors, etc.
Considering all possible measurable variables of a systemwemay
imagine a potential state space SP resulting from a state assignment
function FP that serves as an upper bound on what states the
controlled component can actually be in. In general this potential
state space may not even be finite. For example, using the natural
numbers to represent the possible values for the floor representing
the elevator car’s position while stopped gives an infinite set of
possibilities. In practice, reality is bounded in various ways. For
example, in a 5-story building the elevator car can never be on
floor 6. When defining the “true” state of a controlled component,
we may imagine that there is some finite set of variables that can
be measured, and that access to those values would provide an
accurate picture of reality, that we call the ground truth process
model.
Definition 6. The ground truth process model for a component is a
process model (Pr , Fr , Sr ,Tr ) such that every state of Sr is reachable
viaTr from some initial state s0. That is, for every state sn ∈ Sr , there
is some sequence s0, s1, . . . , sn−1, sn such that (si , si+1) ∈ Tr for every
0 ≤ i ≤ n.
The ground truth process model is not typically known a pri-
ori. For a non-trivial system it may be hard to create an exhautive
ground truth process model consisting of all reachable states. We
would like to stress that the ground truth process model is not ex-
pected to be built a priori, or at any time, by the system designers
or operators. Rather, the ground truth process model is the hypo-
thetical and accurate behavior model of the system under normal
and some abnormal operations. The purpose of defining the ground
truth process model is to contrast it with the known process model.
There can also be multiple ground truth process models for the
same system under different abnormal operations (e.g. under dif-
ferent adversarial assumptions). When new abnormal operations
happen, naturally the ground truth process model will also expand
to include the new reality. Therefore, one may think of the ground
truth process model as the process model of the system under the
normal and abnormal operations we are considering for analysis.
A known process model and a ground truth process model can
differ in two primary ways. The known process model can either
be incorrect, incomplete, or both, as defined below.
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S1
S2
S3
Sr
Figure 2: Forced State and Transition
Definition 7. Let (Pk , Fk , Sk ,Tk ) and (Pr , Fr , Sr ,Tr ) be known and
ground truth process models respectively. The known process model is
incorrect iff Sk \ Sr , ∅ or Tk \Tr , ∅. The known process model is
incomplete iff Sr \ Sk , ∅ or Tr \Tk , ∅. When the known process
model is incomplete, a forced state is any state s ∈ Sr \ Sk and a
forced transition is any transition t = (s1, s2) ∈ Tr \Tk .
Intuitively, incorrectness refers to errors, and incompleteness
refers to missing transitions and states in the known process model.
In practice, it is possible for the known process model maintained by
the controller to be incorrect in the sense of Definition 7. However,
in the context of security incorrectness is not always a cause for
concern. If one can make security guarantees based on assuming
the system can reach more states than it really can, this typically
means that those security guarantees would still hold in the more
restricted system without those states.
Incompleteness is somewhat different from incorrectness. It is a
simple application of the definitions to note that for an incomplete
known process model, there must be either a forced state or a forced
transition. These are depicted in Fig. 2, where known states and
transitions are represented with solid lines, and forced states and
transitions are represented with dotted lines. Thus, sr is forced state,
and (s1, sr ) is forced transition into the forced state from known
state s1. Similarly, (s3, s2) is a forced transition between known
states.
Forced states and transitions naturally pose potential dangers
that incorrectness doesn’t. Namely, safety properties satisfied by
the known process model may not be satisfied by the ground truth
process model. In a distributed system, safety properties [1] of the
system must evaluate to true in the states of the system during
operations. Safety properties are inherent properties of any given
state, and are not dependent on the details of attacks or failures
that caused the system to enter that state. We apply this concept
of safety properties to the states of the controlled process. Hybrid
automata use the concept of a bad state to describe states where at
least one safety property is violated [27]. We define bad state and
normal state formally below.
Definition 8. A normal state, sn ∈ Sn ⊆ SP , is a state where all
safety properties will evaluate to true. Sn is the normal state space. A
bad state, sb ∈ Sb ⊆ SP , is a state where at least one safety property
will evaluate to false. Sb is the bad state space.
SP
Sr
Sk
Sb
Figure 3: State Space
Figure 4: Car Controller State Space
The definition of the bad states makes no reference to the known
or ground truth process models. The general case (assuming a cor-
rect known process model) is depicted in Fig. 3. Notice, in particular,
that there may be many states in the ground truth process model
that are unknown, yet are not bad states. That is, forced states are
not necessarily bad states. This means that the mere fact of enter-
ing unknown states need not violate safety properties of interest.
However, if (Sr \ Sk ) ∩ Sb , , the attacker can succeed.
For the elevator example, consider the situation depicted in Fig. 4.
We could define a safety property: "Elevator Car will not move with
the car door open." Given this safety property, the states with solid
outlines (described in Table 3) are normal states. A Car Controller
state X corresponding to <OPEN,ON> is a bad state, since we don’t
want the car running with its door open. In this example, the bad
state X in Fig. 4 is a forced state because there is some way to
transition into it from the STOPPED state. An adversary able to
force a transition into this state would violate the safety property.
Alternate safety property definitions may result in differing normal
and bad state designations.
The constituent variables of the multivariable may be analyzed
directly for the evaluation of safety properties. That is, rather than
evaluate a safety property against a state, it may be evaluated
against a variable assignment. Regardless of whether a variable
assignment is in the domain of Fr or Fk , safety properties may
be evaluated against them. It should be noted, however, that for
consistency in this case, when two variable assignments get mapped
to the same state, they should either both satisfy the safety property
or both fail the safety property.
Lemma 1. Let (Pk , Fk , Sk ,Tk ) and (Pr , Fr , Sr ,Tr ) be a known pro-
cess model and a ground truth process model, respectively. If there is
a forced state, then there is a forced transition.
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Proof. Let sn ∈ Sr be the forced state assumed to exist. By
Definition 6, there is some sequence s0, s1, . . . , sn−1, sn such that
(si , si+1) ∈ Tr for every 0 ≤ i ≤ n. In particular t = (sn−1, sn ) ∈ Tr
but t < Tk because Tk ⊆ Sk × Sk and t < Sk × Sk . □
In the elevator example, the state X in the ground truth process
model for Car Controller (Figure 4), cannot be disconnected from the
other states, since this state is reachable in the ground truth process
model due to a cyber attack or a system failure. This transition is
shown by the dotted arrow from STOPPED state to X state.
4.3 Process Model Inconsistency
In the previous section, our treatment of incorrectness and incom-
pleteness of the known process model with respect to a ground
truth process model naturally invoked the notion of safety property.
Young and Leveson [30] note that problems arise due to an incon-
sistency between the known process model and the ground truth.
This holds irrespective of whether or not particular safety proper-
ties are violated. That is, process model inconsistency (PMI) is a
potentially deleterious effect in itself. In this section we therefore
formally define PMI and prove that it necessarily poses a danger
for all incomplete known process models.
Intuitively, PMI occurswhen the observationsmade in the known
process model differ from those of the ground truth process model.
In order to talk meaningfully about observations of the ground
truth from within the known process model, we need a way of
connecting the two process models to define the known process
model’s observations of the ground truth. Since observations in
the known process model correspond to interpretations of variable
assignments p ∈ Pk , it is sufficient to connect the ground truth
variable space Pr with the known variable space Pk .
In general, these two spaces may not be related. For example,
the variables tracked in the known process model might not be
direct measurements. However, it is with no loss of generality that
we may assume the ground truth variable space to be a superset
of the known variable space. We can always expand Pr to contain
known variables not otherwise present, and simply allow Fr to
be insensitive to the values of these extra variables. This will not
interfere with the established aspects of the ground truth model.
We formally define this structured connection between known
process models and ground truth models below.
Definition 9. Let (Pk , Fk , Sk ,Tk ) and (Pr , Fr , Sr ,Tr ) be known and
ground truth process models respectively. Themodels are connected by
inclusion and projection (or just connected) iff Pk = P1k×P2k · · ·×Pmk ,
and Pr = P1r ×P2r ×· · ·×Pnr , where n > m and P ik ⊆ P ir for 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
ι : Pk ↪→ Pr is the natural inclusion of Pk into Pr , where fixed values
for the variable vm+1, . . . ,vn are chosen. π : Pr ↠ Pk is the inverse
(partial) function.
Since the order of presentation of the P i is arbitrary, we choose
a consistent order for P ik and P
i
r to ensure π and ι work component-
wise in the natural way. When two models are connected, their
connection can be depicted as in Fig. 5. The function ι and π allow
us to “move” from one model to the other. This ultimately allows a
clean definition of inconsistency. In particular, we can start with
Pk Sk
Pr Sr
ι
Fk
π
Fr
Figure 5: Connected Process Models
a well-defined notion of observations of ground truth within the
known process model.
Definition 10. A variable assignment p ∈ Pr is observable in the
known process model iff p ∈ dom(π ) and π (p) ∈ dom(Fk ). p ∈ Pr
is correctly observed in the known process model iff p is observable
and Fk (π (p)) = Fr (p). A pair of variable assignments (pa ,pb ) is
observable iff its component variable assignments are observable.
Similarly the pair (pa ,pb ) is correctly observed iff its component
variable assignments are correctly observed.
This definition uses π : Pr ↠ Pk to mediate observations. In-
consistencies may arise because we cannot ensure that Fr and Fk
provide consistent interpretations of the common portions of vari-
able assignments. That is, observations in the known process model
based on access to variables in Pk interpreted according to Fk might
differ from observations in the ground truth process model based on
the larger set of information in Pr with accurate interpretation Fr .
There are two main things that give rise to disagreements. The
current state may simply be unobservable from within the known
process model, or it may make an incorrect observation.
Since P ik ⊆ P ir for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, it is possible for this function
to be undefined for some values. Consider for example a variable
assignment p = (p1,p2, . . . ,pn ) ∈ Pr where p1 ∈ Pr \ Pk . The
resulting variable assignment (p1,p2, . . . ,pm ) is not in Pk , so p is
not in the domain of π . This results in the variable assignment
not representing an observable state in the known process model.
Even if π is defined on a given p ∈ Pr , it is possible that π (p)
is outside the domain of the partial function Fk . Here too, the
variable assignment does not represent an observable state. When
the variable assignment is observable, the known process model
assigns it a definite state. An incorrect observation is one in which
this state disagrees with the state observed by the ground truth
model.
Definition 11. Let (Pk , Fk , Sk ,Tk ) and (Pr , Fr , Sr ,Tr ) be known
and ground truth process models respectively that are connected. A
transition t = (sa , sb ) ∈ Tr is an instance of Process Model Inconsis-
tency (PMI) iff there are some variable assignments (pa ,pb ) resulting
in t and (pa ,pb ) is unobservable or incorrectly observed in the known
process model.
Sometimes, cyber effects may need multiple forced states, forced
transitions, or both to describe them, as we show in the example in
Section 5. The theorem below explores the limitations on observ-
ability of forced transitions in ground truth model given that we
are only equipped with the known process model.
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Theorem1. Let (Pk , Fk , Sk ,Tk ) be an incomplete model with respect
to the ground truth model (Pr , Fr , Sr ,Tr ). Assume they are connected
by inclusion and projection. Then either the ground truth model con-
tains at least one instance of PMI, or there is a forced transition that
is correctly observed.
Proof. By Def. 7, the ground truth process model contains ei-
ther a forced state or a forced transition. But Lemma 1 tells us that
the existence of a forced state implies a forced transition. So we
know there is some (sa , sb ) ∈ Tr \Tk . We take cases on whether or
not sa ∈ Sk and sb ∈ Sk . We examine observability according to
Def. 10 using the map π : Pr ↠ Pk which must exist according to
Def. 9.
Case 1. At least one of sa or sb is in Sr \ Sk . Without loss of
generality, let it be sa . We will now establish what the known
process model might observe. Consider any element p ∈ Pr giving
rise to sa (i.e Fr (p) = sa ). Such a p exists because Fr is surjective
by Def. 4.
Case 1a. If p is not observable, then (sa , sb ) is an instance of PMI
by Def. 11.
Case 1b. If p is observable, then Fk (π (p)) = s ′a ∈ Sk is well-
defined. But since sa < Sk , sa , s ′a , the transition is incorrectly
observed (Def. 10). Thus (sa , sb ) is an instance of PMI by Def. 11.
Case 2. Both sa and sb are in Sk . Consider any (pa ,pb ) such that
Fr (pa ) = sa and Fr (pb ) = sb .
Case 2a. At least one of pa or pb is unobservable. In this case,
(sa , sb ) is an instance of PMI by Def. 11.
Case 2b. Both pa and pb are observable. Thus we can define
s ′a = Fk (π (pa )) and s ′b = Fk (π (pb )).
Case 2b(i). Either s ′a , sa or s ′b , sb . In this case, (sa , sb ) is
incorrectly observed and, hence, it is an instance of PMI by Def. 11.
Case 2b(ii). s ′a = sa and s ′b = sb . In this case, the transition is
correctly observed as (sa , sb ), but this transition was assumed to be
a forced transition, so the last clause of the conclusion is satisfied.
□
When a forced transition is observable, depending on the imple-
mentation of the known process model, this state transition may be
flagged as an error, or ignored. Therefore, the transition from the
STOPPED state to X state in Car Controller is a forced transition
(Figure 4). Given Theorem 1, describing instances of PMI using
a state diagram of the known state space poses some interesting
challenges, since the state diagram of the known state space can
only be used to show forced transitions among the known states.
Interestingly, the converse of Theorem 1 is false. That is, incom-
pleteness is not necessary for PMI. Indeed PMI can occur even when
the known process model is both correct and complete. This could
be due to a tampered sensor sending a false signal to the controller.
Expanding on the elevator example, the controller may receive a
signal that the elevator car went 1 floor up, when, in fact, it went
1 floor down. Both are possible, so there is no inherent problem
with the process model itself. Rather, PMI arises in this instance due
to differences in the observation functions Fk and Fr . This means
that improving the known process model may be insufficient to
fully address instances of PMI! It must be addressed by fixing the
system as a whole.
5 ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
We will presently illustrate the theoretical results from the previous
section using the example of an Automated Teller Machine (ATM)
state machine. We use the ATM state machine described by Iqbal
et al. [14] for our illustration, since this model is formally verified.
Figure 6 reproduces the state machine from [14] with minor modi-
fications for readability. Since this state machine is designed by the
model developers of the ATM, therefore, this state machine is the
known process model by Definition 5.
In this ATMmodel, the states of the ATM are specified in the rec-
tangle boxes, and the state transitions are described by annotated
arrows. The customer is not explicitly modeled, though the state
diagram implies an external customer. The annotations describe
either the conditions for a state transition, or the inputs to a state
that could cause a state transition. These states define the state
space, Sk . Some of the arrows may be interpreted as internal transi-
tion functions, δint . For example, ("Wrong PIN","Print Receipt") as
in Figure 6. Some other transitions may be interpreted as external
transfer functions δext . For example, when the "Insert Readable
Card" external event occurs, the system transitions to "Request
Password" state. There are λ output functions that map the states
to external outputs. For example, from "Verify Account" to an exter-
nal system to "Verify Externally." In this example, we do not show
the state variables, and assume a state assignment function exists
for the known process model. With respect to a safety property of
"ATM will dispense cash to authenticated users," all the states in
the diagram are normal states (Definition 8). On the other hand, if
the safety property is "Only authenticated users are allowed access
to the ATM", the state "Wrong PIN" may be considered a bad state.
In the known process model, this transition will be observed as a
known transition from "Process Transaction" to "Dispense Cash."
A fairly comprehensive summary of ATM attacks and detection
mechanisms are described by Priesterjahn et al. in [25]. The promi-
nent ATM attacks fall in to the following categories: card skimming,
where the information in the inserted bank card is skimmed for
later use; card trapping, where the bank card is trapped after the
transaction is complete using an extraneous device by the attacker
in order to steal it later; PIN capturing, where the user’s PIN number
is stolen while being used; cash trapping, where the cash dispensed
is trapped by the attacker using an extraneous device in order to re-
trieve it later; brute force safe opening to steal the cash in ATM; and
using malware to attack the ATM firmware [25]. There are several
variations of a recent malware attack known as "jackpotting" [28],
and all these variations seek to change the firmware processing of
the ATM. Figure 7 describes the reached states and the ground truth
model of the ATM system while under two physical attacks: card
trapping, and cash trapping, and under jackpotting cyber attack.
When a card trapping attack occurs, the ATM is prevented from
going to the "Eject Card" state by the attacker. Instead, the attacker’s
device prevents the card from ejecting (shows as the "Trap Card"
transition), and once the customer leaves, attacker retrieves the
card. The ATM system is unable to observe this card trapping, and
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Figure 6: ATM State Machine: Known Process Model
Figure 7: ATM State Machine: Ground Truth Model
this forced transition is observed incorrectly as a known transi-
tion by the ATM system. While under the cash trapping attack,
once the "Dispense Cash" state is exited, the system goes to "Trap
Cash" state, where the attacker has inserted a device to prevent
dispensing of cash. The attacker then removes the device, and steals
the cash. Since the known process model does not have this forced
transition, for the ATM system, the forced transition is observed as
the "Take Cash" transition, a known transition. Again, the attack
goes undetected. In all these cases, there were no sensors or state
variables to detect the effects of these attacks, and the effects were
undetectable using the known process model. In the jackpotting
attack, after the "Insert Readable Card" state, the system transitions
to "Activate Malware" state, and skips the authentication states, and
directly transitions to the "Dispense Cash" state, a transition from
an unknown reached state to a known state.
5.1 Practical Implications
We believe the theoretical work described in Section 4 will have
implications in several areas. In this section, we discuss the practical
implications to attack detection, cyber Testing & Evaluation (T&E),
and system design.
5.1.1 Attack Detection. In Section 3 we established that inconsis-
tent process model is a control loop effect of several kinds of cyber
and physical effects on a cyber-physical system. In Section 3, we
formalized the concept of inconsistent process model as Process Model
Inconsistency (PMI). In legacy systems, the existing sensors and in-
strumentation are primarily used to support the normal operations,
and hence the known process model of the system. Further, the
known process model is implemented using the controller firmware.
Even if we assume the firmware has no bugs and accurately im-
plements the known process model, a very unlikely situation in
most systems, by Theorem 1, we could predict it is likely that some
of the cyber attacks cannot be detected by just instrumenting the
firmware, since this will not help make the known process model
complete.
While it is not possible to develop a comprehensive ground truth
process model a priori and identify all the missing state variables
that need to be monitored for effects, it is important to maintain and
augment the known process model for critical system components
when the system is operating, well after the design is complete.
The possibility of incorrect observation of a forced transition as a
known transition is a concrete possibility, implying if cyber attacks
are only reported by observing the effects in the firmware of the
controller, the attack reports will be inaccurate or underreported.
To detect attacks as they happen, dynamic behavior of a system
needs to be analyzed, including the communications to and from the
controller. Using threat intelligence information and circumstantial
evidence may also need be used to augment detection capabilities,
since in many real systems proving an attack has happened with
evidence may not be feasible because systems are not instrumented
to collect relevant evidence.
Theorem 1 opens the possibility of correctly observing a forced
state transition, say (sa , sb ). This is a kind of anomaly detection, and
so some attacks may be correctly detected in this way. However,
the potential to miss forced transitions points to limitations in
the effectiveness of anomaly detection, because it is quite possible
that anomalies may not be observable or correctly observed in the
known process model, leading to higher false negatives.
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5.1.2 Cyber T&E of CPS. Cyber T&E concerns with the testing of
CPS under various attack scenarios, and cyber modeling & simula-
tion (cyber M&S) is a commonly used approach to conduct cyber
T&E [9]. Observing the effects of attacks is a key aspect of cyber
T&E. The previous section points to the need to expand instrumen-
tation and sensors to variables beyond what is needed for system
operations. This need applies to models used in cyber M&S also.
Otherwise, the testers themselves may experience PMI without
being aware of it.
5.1.3 System Design. An improved system design approach would
need to focus on detection of forced transitions, irrespective of
whether these transitions lead to normal or bad states. For example,
in the ATM example, if somebody attempts entering PIN more than
10 times, it is not detectable, though the entire state machine for
entering a wrong PIN is in the known process model. The known
process model may need to be expanded to include "Count Wrong
PIN Attempts" and associated transitions. Another improvement
that could help is the elimination of the default assignment of states.
For example, in the ATM example, once cash is dispensed, there is
no timer to detect whether the cash has left the dispense tray in a
timely manner. The ATM system, after "Dispense Cash" state, could
prevent the default transition to "Another Transaction," if there was
a timer that detects cash has been in the dispense tray longer than
a preset time. The cash trapping attack might be detected this way.
6 CONCLUSIONS
We introduced Process Model Inconsistency (PMI) as an important
control loop effect of several types of physical and cyber attacks
on Cyber-Physical Systems in Section 3. We showed that it is quite
possible to either not observe a PMI effect at all during or after
an attack, or come to incorrect conclusions based on the observa-
tions of the effects of an attack on the controller or firmware. We
illustrated the theoretical results with an example of an Automated
Teller Machine (ATM) undergoing two physical and a malware
attack. We also described some practical implications of the limita-
tions on observability in the areas of attack detection, cyber T&E,
and system design. Evaluating these implications rigorously from a
security perspective, and improving the security of new and legacy
CPS based on these implications remain to be done. This paper does
not address the impact of cyber attacks on liveliness properties, and
we hope to address this in future work.
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